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THE IMPACT OF VEHICLE TOLLS ON HAMPTON ROADS:  
JOB MOBILITY, RESIDENTIAL LIVING CHOICES AND 
REGIONAL COHESION
V
ehicle tolls are nothing new in Hampton Roads. Both the Downtown Tunnel (DTT), which opened in 1952, and the Midtown Tunnel (MTT), which opened 
in 1962, extracted 25-cent tolls from drivers of vehicles passing through them until 1986. The Virginia Beach Expressway (now I-264) opened in 1967 
and was funded with tolls as high as 25 cents for passenger cars and a bit higher on a per axle basis for trucks. These tolls were removed in 1996.  
The Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT) extracted a $1.25 toll from 
automobiles between 1957 and 1976.  
The Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (CBBT) has been tolled since it opened in 
1964. Currently, that toll is $13 for passenger cars for a single trip, $26 for a 
three-axle truck and $47 for a six-axle truck. Repeat travelers qualify for much 
lower tolls. 
Now, we have a new set of tolls – this time on the DTT, MTT and the Martin 
Luther King Freeway (MLK). The tolls are designed to help pay for a $2.16 
billion transportation improvement project negotiated by the Commonwealth 
of Virginia under the aegis of the Public/Private Partnership Act of 1995. The 
centerpiece of the project is a new tunnel tube for the MTT that will improve 
traffic flow between Norfolk and Portsmouth, as well as to points west and 
south. The new tube will increase the MTT to four lanes and presumably 
expedite traffic going to and from the Sentara/Eastern Virginia Medical School 
health complex, Old Dominion University, the port and Naval Base Norfolk. 
More than a little controversy has accompanied this project because at least 
one study has suggested that the adverse impact of new vehicle tolls would be 
especially large for the city of Portsmouth.1 The new tolling arrangement also has 
pushed to the forefront questions about the viability of any regional strategy that 
would pay for a new (third) crossing over the James River estuary, and perhaps 
1   James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014. The report may be 
accessed at www.jamesvkoch.com under the “Consulting Reports” icon.  
even the widening of I-64 to Richmond, by means of tolls. Finally, this project 
has caused both members of the public and legislators to take a closer look at 
the Public-Private Partnership Act of 1995, which enabled the current project 
and its surrounding financial arrangements.  
What are the new DTT, MTT and MLK tolls? While 
lower initially, beginning in 2016, drivers of passenger cars 
going through either the DTT or MTT tunnel will pay 
$1.84 during peak hours, while drivers of trucks will pay 
$7.36. During off-peak hours, they will pay $1.59 and $4.77, 
respectively. MLK tolls will be 50 cents for tunnel users 
and $1 for non-tunnel users. However, these are E-ZPass 
(electronic) rates and drivers of vehicles without an 
E-ZPass transponder will pay triple these amounts.  
The Public-Private 
Partnership Act Of 1995
The tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK are one product of a 58-year 
“Comprehensive Agreement” between the Commonwealth of Virginia and 
Elizabeth River Crossing OpCo (ERCO),2 made possible under provisions of the 
1995 Public-Private Transportation Act (PPTA).3 This particular agreement took 
effect in 2012 and has been amended since then.  
The Comprehensive Agreement with ERCO included the construction of a 
second MTT tunnel tube (increasing it to four lanes), extending the MLK Freeway 
from High Street to I-264, and rehabilitating the existing DTT and MTT tunnels. 
The advertised total cost of these projects was $2.16 billion.   
The primary impetus for the PPTA was the apparent inability of the 
Commonwealth to finance most of the large transportation infrastructure 
projects that legislators and citizens wished to pursue. Hence, in the PPTA, the 
Commonwealth turned to the private sector for help. It is not clear that, at the 
time, all concerned understood that private-sector investors/operators would 
demand a rate of return on their invested capital that would be competitive in 
the milieu of large, private-sector corporations. This would not be a world of 
3 percent interest rates on 10-year U.S. government bonds.  
The PPTA delegates responsibility for developing and approving public-private 
transportation partnerships to the governor, who in turn may delegate that 
responsibility to another individual, such as the secretary of transportation. 
As of this writing, approval of the Virginia General Assembly is not required, 
regardless of the size of the project.  
ERCO is responsible for collecting tolls and for achieving the traffic volumes 
outlined in its forecasts, which may be a bit optimistic. While there is no 
guaranteed rate of return for ERCO on its investment, ERCO is authorized 
2   ERCO’s lead firms are Skanska Infrastructure Development and Macquarie Group, both of which are public-
private partnership (PPP) developers and infrastructure investors as well as operators throughout the world. For 
more information about ERCO, see www.erc-info.com. 
3   Among completed Virginia PPP projects are: the Pocahontas Parkway (Route 895) across the James River, south 
of Richmond; a 17.5-mile stretch of Route 288 west of Richmond; and the Route 199 partial loops around 
Williamsburg. 
to earn 13.5 percent on its invested capital. If that rate of return does not 
materialize because competing facilities have been constructed by the 
Commonwealth, then the Commonwealth must compensate ERCO for the 
shortfall. However, if ERCO’s revenues exceed forecasts (implicitly, the 13.5 
percent rate of return), then ERCO will share a portion of the excess with the 
Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT). The percentage share of excess 
gross revenues increases as the amount of gross revenues earned by ERCO 
increases.4 VDOT is required by law to use the shared revenue on transportation 
improvements in the corridor. 
The Comprehensive Agreement gives ERCO the authority to raise tolls 3.5 
percent annually if it wishes to do so, beginning in 2016. However, if the 
annual growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI) in the preceding 12 
months was higher than 3.5 percent, then ERCO may choose to increase its tolls 
by that percentage. Assuming that ERCO takes advantage of these provisions, 
this means, at a minimum, that the peak hours and non-peak 
hours tolls for passenger vehicles would rise to at least $11.79 
and $8.71, respectively, by 2070. (Peak hours are defined as 
5:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.) Comparable truck 
tolls would rise to at least $47.17 and $30.57, respectively, by 
2070. As we will soon see, because of the CPI provision, tolls 
actually are likely to rise much more than these amounts.
4   If gross revenues exceed baseline forecasts from 5% to 10%, 10% to 20%, 20% to 30% and in excess of 30%, 
then VDOT will share 5%, 15%, 30% and 60%, respectively. ERCO may earn gross revenues up to 5% in excess 
of baseline forecasts before VDOT shares in profits.  
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The Positive Overall 
Economic Impact Of The 
Newly Tolled Project
There is a tendency for the supporters of toll-financed projects to neglect the 
costs associated with those projects and for the opponents of toll-financed 
projects to neglect the benefits of the same projects. Reality is that both benefits 
and costs are generated by toll-financed projects such as the DTT/MTT/MLK 
undertaking in Hampton Roads.  
Let’s focus for a moment on the primary benefits typically associated with a new 
toll project:
• Reduced travel times
• Increased trip and travel reliability
• Reduced traffic congestion 
• Increased fuel economy
• Reduced vehicle operating costs
• Reduced carbon emissions and diminished environmental harm
•  As many as 1,500 additional jobs and associated increased incomes 
connected to construction.
At least five reputable studies have documented that some or all of these benefits 
will be associated with the DTT/MTT/MLK tolling project. For example, The 
Hartgen Group estimates that after completion, the project will increase the 
gross regional product of Hampton Roads by an incremental $365 million to 
$390 million annually and in the process create 4,401 additional jobs.5 “West 
Side” benefits that will accrue are estimated by Hartgen to range between 
$144 million and $148 million, along with 1,736 jobs. The Hartgen Group 
5   “Impacts of Mid-Town Tunnel Improvements on Regional Productivity and Job Mobility,” The Hartgen Group 
(2009), p. 3, www.hartgengroup.net  
also estimated that the increased reliability of travel time across the Elizabeth 
River will have a median value of $63 million to the region.6  
Reputable analysts attribute significant financial benefits to the completion of the 
DTT/MTT/MLK project. It also is fair to say that the analytic consensus is that the 
project will yield significant benefits to the region and the Commonwealth. This, 
however, is not the same as saying that the benefits and costs of the project will 
be spread evenly (or equitably) across the region, or even that the benefits and 
costs will be spread evenly (or equitably) among the residents and businesses 
inside a specific city.  
We Live In An Economically 
Interdependent Region
Both the benefits and the costs of the DTT/MTT/MLK accruing to any city 
depend substantially on how many people in those cities will use these venues 
and end up paying tolls, either because they leave a city (perhaps Suffolk) to 
work in another, or because people in other cities leave those cities to come 
work in this city (Suffolk). Table 1 reports U.S. Census data describing where 
people live and where they work in Hampton Roads.  
Reading down the columns, one can see to whom each city or county is 
supplying workers. Taking Newport News as an example, one can see that 
this city supplies 13,744 people who work in Hampton; 40,661 workers 
in Newport News remain there for their jobs; 5,236 go to work in Norfolk; 
3,724 travel to work in Virginia Beach; and 15,062 workers are employed 
outside of Hampton Roads.
Reading across the rows, one can discover where a city or county’s workers 
come from. Virginia Beach, for example, receives 23,138 workers from 
Norfolk; 6,925 from Portsmouth; 10,727 from Hampton Roads locations north 
of the James River;7 and 29,576 workers from outside Hampton Roads.  
6   “Value of Improvements in the Reliability of Travel Time Resulting from MTT Improvements,” The Hartgen Group 
(2009), p. 2, www.hartgengroup.net   
7   These workers travel to Virginia Beach from Gloucester County, James City County, Mathews County, York 
County, Hampton, Newport News, Poquoson and Williamsburg.
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TABLE 1
WHERE PEOPLE LIVE AND WORK IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2011
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Currituck County, N.C. 7,482 2,693 12 -   12 1 1 1 -   7 385 11 11 54 1 47 52 335 3 3,856
Franklin 13,545 20 2,847 30 860 57 20 3,329 90 47 345 60 204 194 13 355 1,372 281 -   3,422
Gloucester County 13,206 3 5 5,550 61 428 665 28 2 489 116 317 972 127 75 116 99 280 54 3,819
Isle of Wight County 14,025 36 184 20 4,265 183 38 441 320 164 547 807 1,381 285 36 731 1,836 293 20 2,435
James City County 37,618 16 38 1,363 310 12,055 286 82 329 2,869 418 1,269 4,827 347 234 356 401 757 1,130 10,532
Mathews County 2,045 4 4 267 4 28 711 -   2 37 22 37 66 13 9 7 9 17 2 808
Southampton County 3,543 4 327 4 153 4     -   1,554 40 8 46 12 20 32 1 58 120 43 1 1,116
Surry County 3,113 3 5 48 258 115 11 41 726 89 117 79 171 35 16 50 83 138 11 1,115
York County 28,992 8 28 1,695 417 3,388 208 63 74 6,067 446 2,380 5,347 428 613 428 391 828 526 5,656
Chesapeake 132,806 1,777 97 478 1,441 701 104 178 70 15 41,070 3,162 3,288 13,226 137 9,498 6,504 30,394 129 20,535
Hampton 76,504 43 40 1,130 1,717 1,833 189 70 30 5,047 3,469 23,816 13,744 3,910 1,634 1,956 2,103 5,088 213 10,471
Newport News 134,154 116 127 4,822 4,837 4,463 662 246 102 10,072 4,819 21,508 40,661 3,973 2,193 3,518 4,659 6,376 463 20,537
Norfolk 192,051 1,086 63 106 1,742 1,334 183 163 65 1,432 27,297 6,484 5,236 50,825 285 10,249 6,909 52,164 228 26,201
Poquoson 2,410 1      -   50 35 40 5 4      -   291 50 297 344 37 875 32 33 80 3 232
Portsmouth 61,237 392 50 131 1,312 255 34 92 38 304 11,722 1,721 1,881 6,044 44 16,620 5,065 8,466 38 7,027
Suffolk 37,179 155 447 222 2,074 333 40 825 101 368 4,341 885 1,355 1,710 76 3,015 12,107 2,905 29 6,193
Virginia Beach 229,365 1,621 -   612 1,329 1,130 137 179       -   1,082 25,843 3,631 3,724 23,138 196 6,925 4,790 125,237 215 29,576
Williamsburg 19,123 5 13 921 145 5,679 105 41 174 2,078 205 686 3,162 212 125 196 184 348 1,407 3,437
Outside Hampton 
Roads      -     5,045 2,163 2,151 320 1,935 1948.4 5,314 1,794 11,600 15,274 11,424 15,062 16,090 2,201 477 16,026 32,761 2,591          - 
1,008,398 13,027 6,451 19,600 21,293 33,962 5,347 12,652 3,958 42,067 136,532 78,584 101,456 120,681 8,765 54,634 62,745 266,790 7,062 156,968
Sources:  U.S. Census Bureau, 2013: OnTheMap Application. Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Program. http://onthemap.ces.census.gov 
http://lehd.ces.census.gov/applications/help/onthemap.html#!what_is_onthemap 
Jobs are “primary jobs,” and include military personnel and self-employed. 
Primary jobs: Public- and private-sector jobs, one job per worker. A primary job is the highest-paying job for an individual worker. 
Source of jobs data: “Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by Census Region and Division, Seasonally Adjusted,” www.bea.gov
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The import of the numbers in Table 1 is inescapable:
•  Economically speaking, we are a highly interdependent region – most of our 
workers live in one city or county, but work in another. Fully 64.9 percent of 
our workers leave their home city or county when they go to their jobs.    
•  Even Norfolk, bolstered by its traditional role as a headquarters site and job 
magnet, finds that 57.9 percent of its employed residents work in a different 
city or county.
•  Many of our workers “cross the water” in north-south directions. An estimated 
71,000 people holding jobs in Hampton Roads cross the James River estuary 
every day to and from Hampton and Newport News to go to work.8 They 
account for approximately 120,000 daily trips.
•  Business and delivery trucks crossing the James River to and from Hampton 
and Newport News add approximately 70,000 daily trips to this number on 
a typical day.   
•  Many of our workers also “cross the water” in east-west directions. Roughly 
85,000 people (8.5 percent) move between eastern Hampton Roads and 
western Hampton Roads as they travel to work. About two-thirds of them 
utilize the DTT and/or MTT when they do so. This activity accounts for 
approximately 140,000 daily trips.
•  Business and delivery trucks (for example, those emanating from the port) add 
an approximate additional 75,000 trips to this east-west number.9
Some important deductions spring from these data. Approximately 25 
percent of all workers in the region are tied to jobs that 
require them to commute over bridges and tunnels to their 
jobs, or whose jobs require them to make business and 
delivery trips that utilize the same crossings. To the extent that 
drivers must pay high tolls when they utilize these venues, 
we risk dividing our region into three parts: Eastern Hampton 
Roads (Norfolk and Virginia Beach), Western Hampton Roads 
8   Approximately 20 percent of individuals utilize car pools or public transportation, or telecommute, thus reducing 
the actual number of trips undertaken.
9  The business and delivery trip estimates are based upon the Koch study cited in footnote 1 and are based upon, 
inter alia, an actual physical count of the types of vehicles entering the DTT and MTT.
(Portsmouth, Suffolk and points west) and the Peninsula. Only 
Chesapeake would appear to be situated in such a way that its drivers would 
not have to access the DTT and MTT with any frequency. However, Chesapeake 
drivers, like all others Southside, would have to pay to get to the Peninsula if 
those crossings were to become tolled.   
Nearly two and a half centuries ago, in 1776, Adam Smith, in his “An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” noted how the division 
and specialization of labor and general economic prosperity were tied to the 
size of available markets. This is among the reasons Smith was a free trader. 
He objected to tariffs and taxes that prevented consumers and businesses from 
making mutually profitable connections. A toll may be viewed as a tariff (tax) 
on movement. Were he alive today, Smith likely would eschew tolls in favor of 
other means of funding road, bridge and tunnel improvements.  
If we impose high tolls on bridges and tunnels in Hampton Roads and separate 
our regional market into three distinct and perhaps competing parts, then there 
will be consequences. The size of our labor pool will shrink as 
workers decline to pay the tolls necessary to commute over 
bridges and tunnels. This will mean some employees will have 
to settle for lower wages and some employers won’t be able 
to hire the best possible employees. Businesses will find that 
the number of customers to whom they have easy access will 
decline. Customers will have an incentive to find alternate, less 
expensive suppliers, perhaps using the Internet to fuel their 
searches. This is a recipe for economic decline.
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The Relative Burden Of 
The Tolls
Only a brief glance at the Table 1 commuting matrix is needed to see that the 
imposition of tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK will not have much impact on the 
Peninsula. It’s true that 1,721 Hampton residents commute to Portsmouth for 
their jobs and 1,956 Portsmouth residents commute to Hampton for their work. 
Some of these 3,677 people may have to pay the tolls, though many of them 
may choose the “back side” commuting path of some combination of I-664, 
I-264, State Route 164 and U.S. Route 17 to travel to their jobs. Virtually all 
who reside in Newport News or to the north will be able to exercise the same, 
toll-free option.  
Not surprisingly, the primary burden of the tolls will fall upon four Southside 
cities: Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach. Of these cities, easily the 
largest burden will fall upon those who live or work in Portsmouth and must travel 
back and forth through the DTT or MTT to get to their jobs and return home. 
Table 1 illustrates Portsmouth’s exposed situation. Fully 10,249 people live in 
Portsmouth and work in Norfolk; 6,044 do the reverse. Another 6,925 people 
live in Portsmouth and work in Virginia Beach, while 8,466 reverse that flow. 
When one adds the very few individuals that live or work in Chesapeake or 
Currituck County, but nevertheless use the DTT and MTT, a total of 32,279 
people likely will use the DTT and MTT to go to work in and out of Portsmouth.  
Portsmouth’s job base of 61,237 is an approximate measure of the size of 
its economy. A rough-and-ready measure of the impact of the new tolls on 
Portsmouth is the percentage (52.7 percent) of the city’s “in and out” commuters 
among its job base.  
How does this compare to the other Southside cities that primarily will be 
affected by the tolls? Graph 1 indexes the impact the tolls will have on Norfolk, 
Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach as the percentage of each city’s job 
base consisting of “in and out” commuters that must use the DTT and MTT to go 
back and forth to work. The impact is least on Virginia Beach. While Table 1 
discloses that an estimated 6,925 + 8,466 = 15,391 people will be “in and 
out” commuters to and from Virginia Beach and Portsmouth, Suffolk and points 
west (and hence probably must use the DTT and MTT), this is only 6.7 percent 
of Virginia Beach’s substantial job base of 229,365.  
Graph 1 indexes Virginia Beach’s percentage at 1.00. Norfolk slides in 
above Virginia Beach with an index of 1.15, followed by Suffolk at 3.45 and 
Portsmouth at 4.12. In relative terms, the impact of the tolls will be more than 
four times greater upon Portsmouth than on Virginia Beach. The relative impact 
of the DTT and MTT tolls upon Chesapeake and the cities and counties on the 
Peninsula is minuscule by comparison.   
How high is “high” when we are talking about tolls? In 
2016, drivers of passenger cars will pay $1.84 during peak 
hours to drive through either the DTT or MTT. Workers/
drivers that do so twice a day, 250 days per year (and 
perhaps throw in a couple of more passages per month 
for other purposes) will spend about $1,000 per year on 
these tolls. This is approximately 2.2 percent of the median 
household income in the cities of Portsmouth and Norfolk 
and, based upon studies in other metropolitan areas, it is 
sufficient to change behavior. Tolls that extract 1 percent 
or less of median household income annually appear to be 
regarded by most drivers as a nuisance, but do not often 
change decisions about where they choose to work, live or 
spend leisure time.
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GRAPH 1
RELATIVE BURDEN OF THE NEW TOLLS UPON SOUTHSIDE HAMPTON ROADS CITIES
Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
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Future Increases In Tolls For 
The DTT And MTT
The Commonwealth’s agreement with Elizabeth River Crossings permits ERCO to 
increase tolls by 3.5 percent annually, or the growth in the consumer price index 
over the trailing 12 months, if that is higher. As Graph 2 illustrates, this means 
that the $1.84 peak-time toll for passenger cars would increase to $11.79 in 
2070 if tolls increased at only 3.5 percent annually, but would jump to $21.56 
if the growth in the CPI between now and 2070 matched what was true 
between 1956 and 2014. During that 58-year time period, the annual growth 
in the CPI was higher than 3.5 percent on 24 occasions.  
Specifically, past CPI growth suggests that tolls will increase at an average of 
4.66 percent per year, not 3.5 percent. Thanks to the miracle of compound 
growth, this would increase ERCO’s total revenue by slightly more than 82 
percent over the 3.5 percent scenario.10
Graph 3 reveals that the $7.36 peak-hour toll that trucks will pay in 2016 
will grow to $47.17 if tolls increase at only 3.5 percent annually, but to a 
stupendous $86.24 if they grow at the aforementioned 4.66 percent annually. 
It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which such tolls inhibit economic 
activity in Hampton Roads.
10  James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014.
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GRAPH 2
GROWTH OF PASSENGER VEHICLE TOLLS, 2016 THROUGH 2070  
(ASSUMING ANNUAL INCREASES OF 3.5 PERCENT OR THE CPI, WHICHEVER IS GREATER)
Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
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GRAPH 3
GROWTH OF TRUCK TOLLS, 2016 THROUGH 2070  
(ASSUMING ANNUAL INCREASES OF 3.5 PERCENT OR THE CPI, WHICHEVER IS GREATER)
Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
5 
 
 
$0 
$10 
$20 
$30 
$40 
$50 
$60 
$70 
$80 
$90 
$100 
Pe
ak
 T
ol
ls 
fo
r 
Tr
uc
ks
 
Tolling Year and Index  
$7.36 
$47.17 
$86.24 
2016 
2070 
 
Growing at 3.5% 
Annually 
2070 
 
Growing at  
3.5% or the 
CPI Annually, 
Whichever is 
Greater 
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 2014102
The Key Role Of 
Discretionary Drivers
Table 2 reveals that 32,279 people potentially will go “in and out” of 
Portsmouth daily because of their jobs. If they make round trips, this means there 
are 64,558 potential trips made daily through the tunnels by workers. Some, 
however, will carpool; others will use mass public transportation. Still others 
may telecommute. Based upon the experience of other metropolitan areas, 20 
percent is an approximate estimate of the number of people that will utilize these 
alternatives.  
An estimated 25,000 vehicle trips through the tunnels reflect trucks and business 
vehicles plying their trades on a daily basis. Since the average number of total 
trips through the two tunnels is approximately 125,000 (about 70 percent 
through the DTT), this leaves approximately 50,000 “discretionary” trips daily 
that do not relate to job commuting or the activities of businesses.11 It is these 
individuals who are most likely to be negatively influenced by the new tolls. 
They are people who drive through the tunnels for sundry purposes – shopping, 
recreation, excursions to restaurants and churches, visits to friends and transit to 
other locales.
Discretionary drivers are more likely to utilize the tunnels 
during non-peak hours because they have no need to drive 
during the most congested and more expensive peak hours 
(5:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.). Preliminary evidence 
on tunnel traffic immediately after the imposition of tolls on Feb. 1, 2014, 
revealed that the decline in traffic was much larger during non-peak hours than 
peak hours (Dave Forster, “Traffic Surges to Gilmerton, High-Rise After Tunnel 
Tolls,” The Virginian-Pilot, Feb. 14, 2014). This is precisely the reaction one 
would expect. Those that don’t really need to pay the tolls are the ones most 
likely to decide to stay home, or to relocate their activities closer to their home 
bases.   
11  James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY COMMUTING MATRIX FOR PORTSMOUTH, 2011
Downtown and Midtown Only
From Portsmouth Into Portsmouth
Chesapeake 95 117
Norfolk 10,249 6,044
Virginia Beach 6,925 8,466
Currituck County, N.C. 24 196
Outside Hampton Roads 24 351
Totals 17,317 15,174
“In and Out” total is 32,491, which is 53.1 percent of Portsmouth’s 
job base of 61,237.
All Tolled: DTT, MTT, HRBT, MMMBT, RT17
From Portsmouth Into Portsmouth
Chesapeake 95 117
Norfolk 10,249 6,044
Virginia Beach 6,925 8,466
Currituck County 24 196
Gloucester County 116 131
Mathews County 7 34
York County 428 304
Hampton 1,956 1,721
Newport News 3,518 1,881
Poquoson 32 44
Williamsburg 196 38
Outside Hampton Roads 95 1,405
Totals 23,641 20,381
“In and Out” total is 44,022, which is 71.9 percent of Portsmouth’s 
job base of 61,237.
Note: Downtown Tunnel (DTT), Midtown Tunnel (MTT), Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT), Monitor-Merrimac 
Memorial Bridge-Tunnel (MMMBT) and James River Bridge (RT17) 
Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
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To the extent that discretionary drivers avoid the tolled tunnels, this will inflict 
financial injury upon Southside businesses that have regional rather than local 
clienteles. Consider a restaurant in Olde Towne Portsmouth, an area that 
attracts a significant portion of its guests from outside of the city. Suppose the 
average tab paid by a diner is $35 (counting both lunch and dinner). Then, in 
2016, the $1.84 x 2 = $3.68 tolls paid by the diner would be equivalent to 
a 10.5 percent tax on that dining experience. This is not a recipe for success.  
Contemporary estimates of “price elasticity of demand” (the sensitivity of 
consumers to price changes) suggest that such a 10.5 percent increase in price 
because of the tolls would result in an 8 percent to 12 percent decline in sales 
revenue (holding everything else, such as Department of Defense expenditures 
and general prosperity, constant).  
The financial injury does not end there. Let’s once again focus on Portsmouth. 
Each 1 percent decline in sales tax collections will cost the city of Portsmouth 
$6 million annually. Further, declining sales and profits eventually will reduce the 
value of the city’s businesses and the properties where they are located. Each 
1 percent decline in the assessed valuation of properties in the city of Portsmouth 
will reduce its tax collections by about $900,000. Of course, Portsmouth’s loss 
could become another city’s gain.
While Portsmouth is the Southside city most vulnerable to 
the tolls, other cities such as Norfolk also attract many of 
the discretionary drivers that utilize the tunnels to travel to 
businesses and restaurants in Norfolk, patronize regional 
attractions such as the Chrysler Museum of Art, the Norfolk 
Tides and the Norfolk Admirals, or drive to educational 
institutions such as Tidewater Community College, Norfolk 
State University and Old Dominion University. Indeed, because 
of its long-standing status as a cultural, legal, financial and 
educational center for Hampton Roads, Norfolk appears to 
attract a higher proportion of discretionary travelers than any 
other city in the region. Hence, it will not escape the burden of 
the tolls.
Future Traffic Volumes 
Through The DTT And MTT
Estimation of traffic volumes when new tolls are imposed upon a travel venue 
is somewhat speculative simply because the tolls represent something entirely 
new as opposed to an increase in price of something that already exists. The 
Commonwealth commissioned several consultants and agencies to provide 
traffic estimates through the DTT and MTT. Among them was Steer, Davies and 
Gleave, whose 2010 report and final report in March 2012 estimated traffic 
flows through 2070: “Downtown Tunnel/Midtown Tunnel/Martin Luther King 
Freeway (MLK) Extension: Traffic and Revenue Forecasts.”  
Steer, Davies and Gleave opined that a 24 percent to 48 percent immediate 
decline in tunnel traffic might occur because of a “shock effect.” The actual 
declines in tunnel traffic that occurred in February 2014, while substantial, were 
not this large. The consulting firm predicts slow, gradual growth in traffic once 
drivers adjust to tolls.  
Straightforward economic analysis suggests that the typical 
passenger car driver eventually will decide to pay the tolls. 
Suppose the value of a driver’s time is $10 per hour and that 
avoiding the tunnels adds 30 minutes to the length of a trip 
across the Elizabeth River. The value of those extra 30 minutes 
to this typical driver is .5($10) = $5, which is substantially 
higher than either the $1 toll in 2014, or the $1.84 toll in 
2016. Hence, an armchair prediction is that the typical driver 
will grumble and perhaps attempt to minimize his/her trips, 
but ultimately will decide that driving through the tunnels 
“Drop in Traffic Takes Toll on Investors in Private Roads,” 
reported The Wall Street Journal on Nov. 20, 2013. The 
WSJ’s Ryan Dezember and Emily Glazer noted that traffic 
volume projections often have been overly optimistic on 
privately owned or operated toll projects.
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(and paying the tolls) is cost efficient after all. Still, this will be 
less true for discretionary drivers than for job commuters and 
businesses.   
Nightmare On Elm Street: 
Tolling The James River 
Crossings
If placing tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK has generated problematic results, then 
consider what would happen if all vehicles using the three major un-tolled James 
River crossings (the Route 17 Bridge, the Monitor-Merrimac Memorial Bridge-
Tunnel and the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel) were subjected to tolls. These 
three James River crossings (which we abbreviate as RT17, MMMBT and HRBT, 
respectively) likely would be tolled if a third crossing over the James River were 
constructed. A third crossing would have cost $2.7 billion a decade ago and 
quite simply neither the Commonwealth nor the region possessed such a revenue 
source.
Refer back to the commuting matrix data found in Table 1. Let’s use Hampton 
as an instructive example. As Table 3 reveals, a total of 15,883 people live 
in Hampton, but are employed in the five major Southside cities: Chesapeake, 
Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach. It would be nearly impossible 
for these commuters to avoid paying tolls unless they carpool, use mass 
transportation or telecommute. There also is a reverse flow: 16,526 people 
live in one of the five Southside cities, but are employed in Hampton. Hence, a 
total of 32,409 people with connections to Hampton would be affected by tolls 
on RT17, MMMBT and HRBT. The comparable number for Newport News is 
38,829. The total for the two Peninsula cities is 71,238.  
Thus, 71,238 is the average daily number of people who 
live in either Hampton or Newport News, but are employed 
Southside plus those people that live Southside, but are 
employed in either Hampton or Newport News.12 Most of these 
people would pay a toll – twice a day – if RT17, the MMMBT 
and the HRBT were tolled in order to pay for a third crossing.
If approximately 20 percent of these commuters carpool, use mass transportation 
or telecommute, then we still are left with about 57,000 vehicles that cross 
the James River each day because of their employment. Add to this perhaps 
25,000 daily business trips and about the same number of discretionary trips, 
and the total average estimated trips nears 110,000.  
12  Note that there are other people who live or work in locations such as Poquoson, James City County and 
Williamsburg that also commute across the James River.  
“My recommendation would be to toll all 4 crossings with 
electronic toll collection, with dynamic pricing (congestion 
pricing, with all the revenues utilized only on the 4 crossings) 
based on time-of-day and day-of-week, designed to optimize 
the usage of all 4 crossings, with a price structure that would 
pay for the entire total cost (debt service on toll revenue bonds) 
of the Third Hampton Roads Crossing project, justifying the 
re-tolling of the JRB and HRBT on the basis that the Third 
Crossing would provide them traffic relief as well as revenues for 
maintenance, and for providing an adjustable optimal traffic 
balance over all 4 crossings.” Scott M. Kozel, “Roads to the 
Future,” April 10, 2005, http://www.roadstothefuture.com/
HR_Crossing_Study.html#PPP-2001
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TABLE 3
WORKERS CROSSING THE JAMES RIVER ON A DAILY BASIS: 
THE FLOW OF MAJOR CITY WORKERS OVER THE RT17 
BRIDGE, MMMBT AND HRBT 
Hampton to 
Chesapeake
3,162
Chesapeake to 
Hampton
 3,469
Hampton to Norfolk 6,484 Norfolk to Hampton  3,910
Hampton to 
Portsmouth
1,721
Portsmouth to 
Hampton
 1,956
Hampton to Suffolk 885 Suffolk to Hampton 2,103
Hampton to Virginia 
Beach
3,631
Virginia Beach to 
Hampton
5,088
Totals 15,883 16,526
Hampton Total: 32,409
Newport News to 
Chesapeake
3,288
Chesapeake to 
Newport News
4,819
Newport News to 
Norfolk
5,236
Norfolk to Newport 
News                        
3,973
Newport News to 
Portsmouth
1,881
Portsmouth to Newport 
News 
3,518
Newport News to 
Suffolk
1,355
Suffolk to Newport 
News
4,659
Newport News to 
Virginia Beach
3,724
Virginia Beach to 
Newport News
6,376
Totals 15,484 23,345
Newport News Total: 38,829
To the Southside Total 31,367 To the Peninsula Total 39,871
Grand Total, “to and from”: 71,238
Source: James V. Koch, “The Different Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
One can quibble with the precise nature of these estimates; they are 
approximations. Even so, the broad lessons of these numbers can 
be grasped easily. The cities and counties of our region are highly 
interdependent. Anything that reduces or frustrates this economic 
interdependence will make us worse off. Significant tolls on 
the three currently non-tolled James River crossings would fall 
into that category because they would increase costs, diminish 
the size of our market, reduce labor mobility and cause our 
incomes to stagnate or decline. Viewed from a national perch, 
significant James River tolls would do much to make our 
region noncompetitive.
Summing It Up
A variety of independent studies have predicted that the overall economic 
impact of the DTT/MTT/MLK project on Hampton Roads will be positive. These 
studies rely upon “present value” estimates that collapse future revenues and 
costs into current dollars so that, for example, costs and revenues in 2040 can 
be compared to costs and revenues in 2016. This is conventional practice in 
economics and finance, and the studies cannot be faulted for their methodology. 
The conclusion, however, is that this project, when completed, will be good for 
our region.  
However, a finding that discounted benefits of the project 
exceed its discounted costs for Hampton Roads as a region 
does not guarantee that all cities and counties in our region 
will experience the same proportionate benefits and costs. 
Indeed, perhaps the most important lesson here is that the 
benefits and costs of the project are unequally distributed 
across Hampton Roads. Much depends upon the locations where people 
actually live and work, which businesses and institutions attract out-of-town 
customers and guests, and the behavior of discretionary drivers.
Norfolk, Portsmouth and Suffolk are the cities most affected by the tolls. 
Portsmouth in particular appealed to the Commonwealth for relief, and Gov. 
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Terry McAuliffe delayed the full onset of the tolls until 2016 by providing the 
project with what has been advertised as $82 million in toll revenue subsidies. 
Prospects for significant long-term financial assistance to the cities are not good, 
however.
Accordingly, the cities should consider:
•  Subsidizing or rebating portions of tolls paid by citizens or 
employees. Moffatt and Nichols’ useful 2012 report to Portsmouth focused 
on ways that this city itself might subsidize or rebate toll payments.13 The cities 
should consider jointly advocating a state income tax credit for cumulative 
tolls paid by an individual above a certain level, say, $250 annually. This tax 
credit easily could be tied to the size of someone’s taxable income in order to 
focus it upon lower-income individuals and households. This would constitute 
a drain on the Commonwealth’s treasury, but the drain would be much smaller 
and more distributed over time than, say, a request for an additional $100 
million in cash or debt contribution by the Commonwealth to the project. This 
might appeal to toll payers elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The cities also 
could rebate their own property taxes and the like on much the same basis.
•  Additional tolling time periods. Daily vehicle traffic through the DTT 
and MTT varies up to 30 percent during a typical week and much more than 
this during a single day. ERCO has responded to these data by developing a 
two-time period model – peak hours and non-peak hours – in terms of the tolls 
it will charge. Experience at other toll sites nationally suggests that as many as 
four distinct tolling time periods may be optimal.  
•  Additional tolling time periods would not cost ERCO revenue if the demand 
for tolled travel were “unit elastic” or better. Practically, this means that a 10 
percent reduction in tolls must result in a more than 10 percent increase in 
toll customers, or a 20 percent reduction in tolls must cause a more than 20 
percent increase in toll customers. 
•  The cities should request that ERCO experiment with additional tolling time 
periods to determine the reaction of drivers. The aim would be to attract 
13   “City of Portsmouth Policy and Legislative Recommendations: Midtown and Downtown Tunnel Toll 
Implementation,” Moffatt and Nichols, Aug. 27, 2012.
more discretionary drivers (for example, those who might patronize a store or 
restaurant, attend church or visit friends).  
•  Enhanced public transportation. The cities should do their utmost to 
publicize Hampton Roads Transit’s Traffix website, www.gohrt.com/services/
traffix, where prospective car poolers can make contact with each other. 
A three-person car pool slices two-thirds of the cost from the tolls paid by a 
single passenger vehicle. Further, the cities should explore additional Elizabeth 
River bus and ferry service with HRT.  
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